....If the Stalin faction's fight against me were only a personal struggle for power, the recounting of this fight would contain nothing instructive: parliamentary history abounds with struggles between groups and individuals seeking power for its own sake. My reason is completely different: it is that the fight between individuals and groups in the USSR is inseparably bound up with the different stages of the October Revolution.
Historical determinism never manifests itself with such force as in a revolutionary period. Such a period, in effect, lays bare clHSS relations and drives conflicts and contradictions to their greatest degree of sharpness. And in such periods, the b attle of ideas becomes the most direct expression of opposing classes or opposing factions of one and the same class. In the Russian Revolution, the struggle against "Trotskyism" has assumed precisely this character. The bond that j oins what are at times essentially scholastic arguments to the m aterial interests of certain social classes or social layers is, in this case, so striking that the day will corne in which this historical experience will occupy a special chapter in the academic handbooks on historical materialism.
Because of Lenin's illness and death, the October Revolution falls into two periods that become increasingly distinct the longer we are removed from them. The first period was the epoch of the conquest of power, of the establishment and consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, of its military defense, of steps essential to finding its economic road. At that time the whole party was aware that it was the prop of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It was from this awareness that it drew its inner confidence.
The second period is characterized by the presence of elements of a growing dual power within the country. The proletariat, which had conquered power with the October Revolution, was pushed aside, forced into the background, as a result of a series of obj ective and subj ective factors of both an internal and external nature. Beside it, behind it, and at times even in front of it, other elements, other social layers, factions from other classes, began to push themselves up. These elements secured a good part, if not of the power itself, at least of the influence over the power. These other layers-the state functionaries, the professional union and cooperative functionaries, people from the liberal professions , and middlemen-increasingly formed an interlinking system. At the same time, by their conditions of existence, their habits and way of thinking, these layers stood apart from the proletariat, or moved away more and more. Ultimately, the party functionaries should be counted among them as well, inasmuch as they form a definitely constituted caste, which assures its own permanence more through the state apparatus than by internal party means.
Because of its origin and traditions, and the sources of its strength, Soviet power continues to rest on the proletariat, even though less and less directly. But through the medium of the social layers enumerated above, it is falling increasingly under the influence of bourgeois interests. This pressure makes itself felt all the more since a large part of not j ust the state apparatus, but the party apparatus as well, is becoming, if not the conscious agent, then at least the effective agent of bourgeois conceptions and expectations. However weak our national bourgeoisie may be, it is conscious, and rightly so, of being a part of the world bourgeoisie , and it serves as the transmission belt of world imperialism. But even the subordinate base of the bourgeoisie is far from being negligible. To the extent that agriculture develops o n a n individual market basis, i t inevitably brings forth a sizable rural petty bourgeoisie. The rich peasant or the peasant seeking only to enrich himself who hurls himself against the barriers of Soviet legality is the natural agent of Bonapartist tendencies. This fact, illustrated by the whole evolution of modern history, is verified once again in the experience of the Soviet republic. Such are the social origins of the elements of dual power that characterize the second chapter of the October Revolution, the period following the death of Lenin.
It goes without saying that even the first period, from 1917 to 1923, is not homogeneous from beginning to end. There, too, we had not only forward movement, but setbacks as well. There, too, the revolution made important concessions: on the one hand to the peasantry, on the other to the world bourgeoisie. Brest- Litovsk was the first setback for the victorious revolution,lOl after which the revolution resumed its forward march. The policy of commercial and industrial concessions, however modest its practical results have been up to the present time, constituted a serious tactical retreat on the level of principle. However, the greatest overall retreat was the New Economic Policy-NEP. By reestablishing a market economy, NEP re-created conditions that threatened to revive the petty bourgeoisie and to convert certain groups and elements within it into middle bourgeoisie. In short, NEP contained the possibilities of dual power. But these did not yet exist except as an economic potential. They commanded a real strength only during the second chapter of the history of October, which generally is considered to have begun with Lenin's illness and death and the beginning of the campaign against "Trotskyism."
It goes without saying that i n themselves the concessions t o the bourgeois classes are not yet a violation of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In general, there are no historical examples of a chemically pure form of class rule. The bourgeoisie rules by leaning on other classes, subjugating them, corrupting them, or intimidating them. Social reforms in favor of the workers in themselves do not in any way constitute a violation of the absolute sovereignty of the bourgeoisie of a country. Of course, each individual capitalist may haye the feeling that he is no longer complete master in his own house-that is in his factorycompelled as he is to recognize the legal limits of his economic dictatorship. But these limitations have no other purpose than to support and maintain the power of the class as a whole. The interests of the individual capitalist constantly come into conflict with the interests of the capitalist state, not just on questions of social legislation, but on questions of taxes, public debt, war and peace, etc. The interests of the class as a whole have the upper hand. They alone decide what reforms can be made and to what extent they can be carried out without shaking the foundations of its rule.
The question is posed in similar fashion for the dictatorship of the proletariat. A chemically pure dictatorship could exist only in an imaginary world. The proletariat in power is obliged to reckon with the other classes in proportion to their strength domestically or in the international arena, and it must make concessions to the other classes in order to maintain its rule. The whole question is in knowing what are the limits to these concessions and what is the degree of consciousness with which they are made.
There were two aspects to the New Economic Policy. First of all, it flowed from the necessity for the proletariat itself to use the methods developed by capitalism to run industry and, in general, the entire economy. Second, it was a concession to the bourgeoisie, and in particular the petty bourgeoisie, in that it allowed them to function economically within their characteristic methods of buying and selling. In Russia, because of its predominantly rural population, this second aspect of NEP was of decisive importance. Given the halt in the revolutionary development of other countries, NEP, which represented a deep and lasting setback, was unavoidable. We put it into effect under Lenin's leadership with complete unanimity. This retreat was called a retreat before the whole world. The party, and through it the whole working class, understood very well what this meant in a general sense. The petty bourgeoisie got the chance to accumulate wealth-within certain limits. But power, and consequently the right to determine these limits of this accumulation, remained as before in the hands of the proletariat.
If the Stalin faction's fight against me were only a personal struggle for power, the recounting of this fight would contain nothing instructive: parliamentary history abounds with struggles between groups and individuals seeking power for its own sake. My reason is completely different: it is that the fight between individuals and groups in the USSR is inseparably bound up with the different stages of the October Revolution....
From:
Preface to La Revolution Defiguree
(May 1, 1929)
Writings of Leon Trotsky 1929
by Leon Trotsky
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