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Saturday, October 16, 2010

U.S. Rightwing radicalism: A Soviet Marxist view

Political Consciousness In the Usa. Traditions and Evolution

TITLE: Political Consciousness in the U.S.A.: Traditions and evolutions.
UNCLASSIFIED: Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.~
PUBLISHER: Progress Publishers
COPYRIGHT: © CTBO «HayKa», 1980
English translation of the revised Russian text
© Progress Publishers 1984
Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
BINDING TYPE: book


excerpts

RIGHT-WING RADICAL TRADITIONS IN AMERICAN
POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS



....“Right-wing radicalism" could also be denoted as " reactionary rebelliousness”. This rebelliousness appears as a phenomenon inherent in bourgeois consciousness, a special part of the political spectrum of bourgeois society in the age of imperialism and socialist revolutions. Right-wing radicalism, which was expressed during the first stage of the general crisis of capitalism in the form of a fascist movement, determined the dominant form oi bourgeois political consciousness in Italy, Germany and in a number of other countries. Right-wing radical traditions in these countries served the creation of ideological and psychological prerequisites for the liquidation of bourgeois-democratic law and order and the formation of totalitarian dictatorial regimes expressing the interests of the most reactionary monopolistic groupings. Following the rout of fascism, right-wing radicalism develops both in the form of neofascist trends, which frankly declare their political continuity in regard to prewar fascism, and also in the form of reactionary trends which, although believing themselves to be far from fascism, actually often represent phenomena basically 147 similar to it even though they take root in a different national climate and in a different historical situation.

The formation of a reactionary-rebellious consciousness usually takes place on the basis of the interaction of two main processes. The leading role here belongs to the evolution of conservatism to the right, when a crisis of more simple, more stable and moderate forms of conservative consciousness leads to its general “hardening” and conservatism becomes less effective as a political movement and ideological trend (and with this as a form for mobilizing the masses politically). While proclaiming with increasing determination its loyalty to the fundamentals of capitalism, conservatism renounces the traditional social institutions to which it swore allegiance yesterday, but which today it already considers dangerous from the point of view of preserving the “fundamentals”. Relinquishing things of minor importance in the status quo for the sake of preserving the main thing is the procedure which consciousness periodically is forced to perform while it is not able and not willing to be reconciled with social progress. And conservatism performs this procedure not only during its swing to the right, but also during the process of a constant painful accommodation with liberal innovations. The basic difference between the two variants of this procedure is that by evolving towards liberalism, conservatism makes a definite concession to the objective demands of social development, while upon becoming transformed into right-wing radicalism, conservatism goes backwards, both in words and deed, towards its fetishes of yesterday. As a result, conservatism becomes so alienated from the status quo that it begins to forfeit its right to be called conservatism. From a guardian of "law and order" it becomes its violator. Its adventurism grows by leaps and bounds, it takes oppositional catch-slogans from the liberals and even from the Left. Regardless of consistency, it tries to make use of the widest possible spectrum of social protest.

Right-wing radicalism’s profound internal dependence on conservatism, both genetic and in substance, predetermines the basic identity of their ideological substratum. While examining conservative consciousness, we have already noted that it is formed mainly on the basis of ideological structures borrowed from other traditions and transformed to a certain degree. This is also true of right-wing radicalism, with the only difference that whereas the ideology of conservatism is “secondary”, the ideological substratum of the right-wing types or consciousness is “tertiary”, since basically it represents a borrowed and transformed (sometimes substantially) ideology of conservatism.

The closeness of conservative and right-wing radical consciousness is also expressed in a similarity of their social and socio-psychological bases.

One can say that the degree of the political success of right-wing radicalism is in direct proportion to the scale of the mood of social protest which is identifiable in the ideological structures of conservatism in its rightward shift.

The process of activating and disseminating social discontent and protest never represents a straight-line movement from active support for the existing order to a clearly apprehended need for a real social alternative. Discontent is usually caused by a systematic practice of infringing the rights of a definite social group, arousing in its consciousness a stable feeling of injustice inflicted by the dominant order and a wish to change it.

The next phase in the development of social discontent is the search for initial causes of injustice on the basis of the generalization of real experience. But this step in the absence of a sufficiently strong influence (at least from the point of view of the possibility of an impact on mass consciousness) of a "subjective factor”, capable of providing a scientifically substantiated answer to sore questions, often turns out to be false. The possibility of a false interpretation of the causes for a social crisis sharply increases when it is a question of the consciousness of a petty-bourgeois type, the very social nature of which hampers an objective analysis of social processes.

The evolution of social protest that gives birth to rightwing radicalism is explained to a large degree by the inability of the individual to find a real community, the defense of whose positions would at the same time be a defense of the individual’s own interests. Mass consciousness leading to reactionary rebellion sharply feels the presence of social antagonisms, and sees in their elimination with the help of radical means the only solution to the pressing problems of society. However, the model of an “organic” society, to which right-wing radicalism strives, is based on a completely false interpretation of the substance of the basic antagonism which is to be eliminated.

This may be interpreted, for example, as an antagonism between races, between ethnic groups, between an individual proprietor and the state, between "productive elements" (i.e., mostly people engaged in the production sector of the economy) and the “nonproductive” intellectuals, between groups differing in the amount of their incomes. In all these versions right-wing radical consciousness seeks to represent "the nation”, "the people”, "the majority" 149 who arc oppressed and exploited in all ways by ihe allmighty minority who have usurped political and economic power. Correspondingly, the way out of the social crisis is seen in struggle by the “nation” united on the basis of this or that motive against the- usurpers, the overthrow of their rule and the reorganization of the whole of society on the basis of an "organically united" race, an ethnic group, the mass of proprietor-individuals, a community of “producers” and so on. A social protest channeled in this direction produces in this way an especially conservative, to be more exact, reactionary result: not simply the preservation of the existing system of social relations, but a restoration of its obsolete, archaic forms.

The self-identification of an individual protesting against the existing order with such a false community becomes possible only under conditions when his protest does not transcend the borders of the consciousness of the petty proprietor, who defends above all his individual conditions for existence, who limits himself to them and therefore is unable to discover a real community that reveals to him a social future. It is precisely on the question of private property that the conservatism of the ruling class, evolving towards the right, and the petty-bourgeois rebelliousness find common ground for their right-wing radical symbiosis.

Despite their common attitude to private property, the two tendencies, on the basis of the merging of which rightwing radicalism exists, in the final analysis exclude one another. The conservatism of the upper crust, appearing in the form of a crude, straightforward defense of private property, represents a last ditch, a frenzied attempt to save a social system which is falling apart. Contrariwise, the petty-bourgeois protest of the lower strata, assuming a right-wing radical form, is only the start of the radicalization of the more backward section of the masses, a process the logical development of which may bring its participants, or at least part of them, to a struggle to topple the existing order.

To achieve their aims the right-wing radicals resort to different methods of political action, which, however, are united by a striving to destroy democracy. Claiming the role of a defender of the "middle class”, and even the driving force in its fight against "conspiracy in high places" and castigating contemporary liberalism as a weapon of the oligarchy, right-wing radicalism inevitably gravitates towards other forms of political action than those that constitute a norm for basic bourgeois political trends and parties.

The propaganda of the right-wing radicals is of a pogrom 150 nature, actually denying their political opponents, primarily, the left-wing forces, their legitimate right to exist. Any kind of pluralism is quite alien to right-wing radical consciousness. This propaganda’, into the bargain, is aimed at undermining the prestige of the ruling elite and of all bourgeois-democratic institutions.

A special type of political organization characteristic of right-wing radicalism is secret societies or sects with a more or less hard structure, bureaucratic: centralism, and strict ideological orthodoxy. Resting on the sects as organizations of leaders, functionaries and activist cadres, right-wing radicalism at the same time takes advantage of methods of mass political mobilization, viz. protest campaigns against certain actions by the government, the nomination of charismatic leaders at elections, a skilled use of television, and the establishment of parties outside the two-party system. All these methods of work among the masses have one characteristic trait: the activity of the masses is precisely regulated and directed from above, the intermediary instances linking the rank and file of the movement with the leadership operate solely "from top to bottom”. Inner-party democracy is strictly proscribed for right-wing radical movements due to the objective incompatibility of the political trends that have brought them to life. At the same time the- combination of bureaucracy and elitism with which the right-wing radical leaders direct their following often results in the latter (at least partially) easily being cooptcd by other political trends. This circumstance only increases the hatred of the right-wing radicals for democracy, increases their intolerance of political opponents.

Right-wing radicals, denying the legitimacy of bourgeois democracy, preaching the cult of force, and regarding themselves as "fighters against tyranny”, take to the path of civil disobedience, of replacing state police functions with a system of private political spying, and, finally, of outright physical terror.A typical example of their rhetoric is a quotation from the right-wing radical newspaper National Spotlight (Dec. 15, 1975): "We have those who caution,’Work within the system! Never challenge a law except as a plaintiff in court in a civil action! As long as a “law” is on the books it is your sac-red obligation to obey it! Your only recourse is to petition your congressman or legislator to change it!’... In short, there is no way to patch up socialism. It must be resisted and challenged, as our Founding Fathers resisted and challenged the British... They knew that a ’higher law’ had to be supported... Patriots must strike hard and they must strike immediately. Tomorrow you will 151 be a slave and will only have slave-tools to resist with.”

Terrorist groups play a special role among the right-wing radicals, for private terror, all the more physical terror, as a downright crime, represents the most direct, frank and brutal challenge to law and order that can be made by a political body. But private terror is not only a challenge to law and order; as an attempt to usurp the right to physical coercion, which is a prerogative of the state, it is a direct substitution, an usurpation of state power.

However, the fact that the right-wing radical terrorists actually act outside the law and that they dispute one of the sovereign rights of the state, is very seldom openly recognized by the state itself. Firstly, right-wing terror serves the same class objectives as the activities of the bourgeois state. Secondly, the state itself exercises physical terror for political objectives, and it does this on an incomparably larger scale than the right-wing radicals. Thirdly, one should take into account the existence in the United States of strong and deep historical traditions of private political violence, originating from the specific traits of the country’s development. (See V.E. Petrovsky, Lynch Law. Essays on the History of Terrorism and Intolerance in the USA, Moscow, 1967, in Russian.)

The bourgeois state, as experience shows, takes steps to protect its monopoly on terror mainly in those cases when an act violating this monopoly hampers the activity of the state in spheres vital for the bourgeoisie. The strictness of these measures, however, only in rare cases accords with the graveness of the crime perpetrated: the contradictions between separate links of the state apparatus, reflecting the infighting of the bourgeoisie, result in the interaction between state and private terror having a restraining impact on the attempts to restrict this latter terror. Thus, the activities of the right-wing terrorists present a contradictory picture; on the one hand, these terrorists are regularly brought to trial for breaking the law, and they operate more or less secretly; on the other hand, it is as regularly discovered that the terrorist organizations have secret patrons within the law enforcement bodies.

Applying a wide range of methods of struggle for power, right-wing radicalism always has in reserve an option for an extra-legal seizure of power by a coup, preferably a military coup. The right-wing radicals attach special importance to work in the army, and usually they find sympathy and backing among the military. They invariably side with the military in all conflicts within the ruling elite whether it be a question of Pentagon appropriations, or the role of the generals in elaborating and realizing military policy.

Speaking of the specific traits of right-wing radical consciousness in the United States, it is necessary to stress the organic interconnection between the phenomenon of right-wing radicalism and the level of the development of the crisis tendencies in society. Pragmatic conservatism, an inert attachment to the socio-political status quo, is most characteristic of the ruling class when it does not apprehend a serious threat to its positions. Only a situation of acute crisis can give rise to sharp dissatisfaction among the bourgeoisie at the ineffectiveness of conservatism and an urge to create more dynamic, more aggressive forms of struggle against social change. The scale of the spreading and influence of right-wing radical consciousness, as a rule, is in direct proportion to the scale of the crisis. Thus, the socio-political crisis of the late ’60s led to a marked weakening of the impact of conservatism among the nonmonopolistic bourgeoisie, while at the same time within the ranks of the financial oligarchy a different consensus was formed—for modernizing conservatism and expanding its base. The oligarchy, more objectively assessing the situation, did not at all consider this crisis fatal for the social foundations, and it favored only a dosed form of authoritarian methods, at the same time making a series of liberal concessions, both in foreign and home policy. This resulted in right-wing radicalism having to be satisfied with the role of an auxiliary force, acting, in the final analysis, in the interests of a wider coalition of conservative forces led by President Nixon. All attempts to transcend the framework of this role aroused sharp dissatisfaction within the monopolistic circles, which assessed them as a threat to political stability, and they inevitably ended unsuccessfully.

A mass protest against the status quo, which assumes a right-radical form, is even more unstable. The natural evolution of a protest of the masses against the oligarchy, which initially develops as right-wing radicalism, in due course inevitably comes into collision with the main stream of this trend, determined by its leading elements which represent the interests of the ruling class. The incompatibility of the tendencies on the basis of which right-wing radicalism is formed sooner or later becomes evident to the bulk of those who adhere to it. As a consequence the movement is shaken from within and it splits into rival groupings, which in the end weakens its potential.

From this it follows that right-wing radical consciousness can be a stable form of political consciousness only for a narrow circle of politically committed persons—- professional or -semi-professional leaders and activists, while right– 153 wing radicalism as a mass phenomenon finds expression mainly in the form of outbreaks of mass political activity, arising from crisis situations. The scale and concrete forms of these outbreaks differ depending on the situation: a mass right-wing radical protest may arise in the form of a purely local and short-term campaign against a definite measure imposed by the authorities (for example, against school bussing in Detroit in 1971, and in Boston in 1974– 1975) or in the form of a more prolonged and broader movement aimed at changing the balance of political forces in the country during a nation-wide crisis situation (for example, the George Wallace for President campaign in the late ’60s and the early ’70s and the New Right movement of the late ’70s and early ’80s). The instability of the mass base, certainly, weakens this trend, but it does not at all turn it into a "paper tiger”. As history teaches, in a situation of an extremely acute social crisis an outbreak of right-wing radicalism may play a decisive role in sharply changing a political regime, in consequence of which the shaky postulates of right-wing radical consciousness receive a mighty support in the form of state coercion. In less critical situations, however, outbreaks of right-wing radicalism do not exert a decisive influence on the fate of a political regime, their instability to a certain degree constitutes an earnest of their repetition.

Right-wing radicalism, which is objectively a form of disorientation of mass protest, fulfills this function the better the more amorphous its ideology and the organization of its mass base. A systematically organized participation by the masses in a right-wing radical movement inevitably explodes it from within, while occasional participation by the masses in this movement, with a constant change of slogans and with an effective isolation of its rank and file from the guidance of the movement, blunts the disenchantment of the masses and, in the end, protects the movement (at least for some time) from disintegration.

One should also note the circumstance that a simultaneous "protest on two fronts" typical of right-wing radicalism— against both a ruling oligarchy and a democratic opposition—creates the possibility for a purely eclectic combination within the framework of one and the same movement of positions inherent in different types of political consciousness. Besides orthodox right-wing radicals, the movement can also embrace conservatives, who prefer to ignore the slogans of the populists, seeing the movement as an instrument for the defense of the fundamentals of an existing order, and the populists, who are attracted to the movement primarily by the fierce attacks staged by the 154 right-wing radicals against the oligarchy, and by their declarations in defense of the "ordinary man”.

Although within the framework of the right-wing radical tradition of the American political consciousness there appear and coexist types personifying different socio– political principles and orientations and resting on different social bases, they possess to this or that degree a number of common features, the sum-total of which constitutes the basic ideological content of the right-wing radical tradition in the United States.

Among these common traits militant nationalism probably plays the leading role. “Americanists”, “patriots”, and “nationalists” are the beloved self-designations of the right-wing radicals. Only a right-wing radical party claims the title of "The American Party”. One of the best known terrorist groups of the right-wing radicals bears the name of Minutemen, an analogy with the legendary militia of the War of Independence. Right-wing publications make wide use of “patriotic” symbols: the star-spangled flag, the bell of liberty, the bald eagle, the Founding Fathers and so on. This fetishism, however, simply boils down to the opposition of a specifically interpreted " national unity" to the ideas of class struggle within the framework of the nation and, at the same time, to the ideas of internationalism, cosmopolitanism, global mutual dependence and so on. All types of right-wing radical consciousness inevitably refer to the category of the “nation”, which is regarded in the ideal as a self-contained, organichierarchical community. Class struggle within the nation and legitimacy of any supranational interests are rejected as running counter to the natural course of things. The need for national unity is motivated by a presence of foreign and internal threats to the existence or the nation.

All this would have been just a simplified version of traditionalist conservatism had it not been for two things. First, unlike conservatism, radicalism refuses to recognize the possibility of reaching "national unity" on the basis of the existing conditions of bourgeois democracy. Secondly, right-wing radicalism expresses not simply an opposition to the class struggle and to “internationalism”, ready to compromise in the name of "national unity”, but it demands an immediate achievement of "national unity" with the help of radical methods and its preservation as a necessary condition for the continued existence of capitalism.

Right-wing radicalism believes that the way to ensuring "national unity" lies in “purging” the nation of those elements and institutions whose existence is conducive to class conflicts. It is a question, first, of the forces that 155 directly clelend the interests of the working class, primarily, of the Communist Party. Secondly, right-wing radi– calism relegates to the "enemies of national unity" forces that recogni/e, although within certain limits, the legitimacy of the class struggle as a norm of political life.

Castigating liberalism, right-wing radical consciousness pays special attention to the liberal elements of the ruling class, whom it regards as mostly responsible for the "disintegration of the nation”. From the point of view of right-wing radicalism the liberalism of the upper crust is not an expression of weakness or short-sightedness on the part of a section of the ruling class, it is not a concession to the people, but a contemplated policy of a small ruling elite, who already wields enormous power and strives to make this power absolute.

The myth about a "natural superiority" of the Americans over other nations is a necessary component of right-wing radical nationalism. In the John Birch Society publication American Opinion, for example, one can find the following assertion:

“While Americans were and are kin to all the world, they are now also different from all the rest of the world— somehow a special breed, though composed of various strains.

“Our common characteristics are due to the American experience, but before concluding that this means environment is more decisive than heredity, we must recall that the decision to come to America required a trait of enterprise, of aggression if you like (or even if you don’t), which would seem to have a genetic base, though by no means confined to the nationality or race. There are bold, curious types in every nation and every race, though among countries long settled there may well be significant statistical differences in the frequency of such types...

“But all those variations are due to centuries of interacting natural selection and cultural development. What happened when America was colonized by Europeans in the XVI, XVII, and XVIII Centuries was that the forbidding prospect beyond the Atlantic served as a screening device to separate the men from the boys, to use a colloquialism, or (to put the matter more gravely) to insure an aboveaverage quotient of audacity... They were the most daring examples of Europe’s Renaissance man, they were the Seventeenth Century’s representatives of high seriousness in religion; they were the Eighteenth Century’s truest English gentry.” [155•1

Racism is a necessary component of right-wing radical consciousness, although it may be manifest in varying degrees. The absolutization of race and ethnic differences between individuals is needed by right-wing radical consciousness as an old, tried-out means for moulding an unauthentic community as opposed to class differences. One type of right-wing radicalism presupposes the direct preaching of race hatred, when race features are advanced as a basis for "national unification”, that is, when the "restoration of the race purity" of the nation is declared to be essential for this “unification”.

Far more common, however, is the use of racism as an auxiliary means to mould mass conceptions of an “ authentic” community. In examining the basis of "national unity”, other types of right-wing radicalism shift the emphasis to features not linked to race origin; still they actively support race demarcation as a “natural” form of social organization and stubbornly oppose all attempts to eliminate race segregation.

During the past 15 years the racist principle of rightwing radicalism has been greatly stimulated and “ substantiated” due to growing resentment and disenchantment among American society over some aspects of government policy in the field of race relations. The criticism of this policy is by no means a monopoly of the racists; in the ’70s this criticism became widely spread and affected practically all types of political consciousness, including the consciousness of the black Americans. However, the conservatives and right-wing radicals made the biggest political capital (at least at the beginning) out of the revision of the liberal reformism of the ’60s. To a certain degree the traditional antiintegration stand of the right wing was a forecast which came true: for one of the main reasons of the crisis of Washington’s policy on the race question was the fierce, many-sided, skillful resistance put up to it by the right wing.

Liberal reformism in the field of race relations is condemned by the right-wing radicals, firstly, as an expression of government interference into a kind of "natural course of things" which presupposes an inherent superiority of whites over nonwhites and a minimal level of relationship between the races; secondly, as "illegal coercion" of the white majority into race integration in public life, as a trampling on individual rights and the rights of the states by the almighty federal government; thirdly, as an economic exploitation of the whites, part of whose incomes is alienated by the same "big government" in the form of taxation, which is then transferred to the nonwhite poor as “welfare”.

A prominent trait among those inherited by right-wing radicalism from its conservative forefathers is traditionalism. The significance of this element of right-wing radical consciousness sharply increased during the mid-’70s in the conditions of a real traditionalistic boom that embraced the American middle class. Right-wing radicalism received a mighty shot in the arm from the real mass sentiments of the so-called "moral majority”, and it modified its own positions accordingly.

The traditionalist orientation of the right-wing radicals was formulated in the early ’80s in one of their program booklets in the following manner:

“The issues of abortion, the meaning of the equal rights amendment, and whether the state should legitimize all alternative life-styles and living arrangements ... reflect a deep ... chasm between two radically distinct and diametrically opposed moral visions of humanity...

“The struggle is between the Judeo-Christian ethic, based on God-given eternal law, and the secular humanist orthodoxy that rejects God and traditional values. In the secular humanist world review, man, individually and collectively, has the absolute power, based on purely human will and reason, to determine all choices that will fulfill his individual and collective well-being.” [157•1

Right-wing radical consciousness in general tends to exaggerate the role of the moral factor in the life of society. The panicky fear experienced by right-wing radicals in face of current socio-political change forces them to search for the unchangeable, eternal, stable, and intransient to which they cling in order to keep their head above water, and, at the same time, to take their bearings in order to understand the nature of the events that oppress them. Nationalistic fetishes and race or ethnic affiliation provide them with some degree of confidence in themselves and in their political orientation, but here a far greater role is played by the "God-given eternal laws”, their view of the world and the related rigid, dogmatic norms of ethics and morality. Compliance with this “law”, the regulation of the behavior of individuals by some "moral code”, strengthened by legal norms, is regarded as almost the most important condition for the normal functioning of society. Correspondingly, any crisis phenomenon in society—from stagflation to the failure of the foreign policy of the state—can be treated as an effect of "moral degradation”, caused in turn by a negation of the divine principle.

In the United States right-wing radicalism is inseparably linked with religious fundamentalism, above all with Protestant fundamentalism. Fundamentalistir forms of religious consciousness are similar to right-wing radicalism, primarily in that in both cases the genetic basis of consciousness is a specific combination of conservativereactionary and radical-rebellious elements. Affiliation to corresponding denominations does not mean, of course, an inevitable identification with right-wing radical political trends, but it serves for the bulk of American right-wing radicals, especially for the rank and file of their movements, as a necessary condition for such an identification.

Religious fundamentalism is vitally necessary for rightwing radicalism. If we consider political conflicts in absolute categories of good and evil, inspired accordingly by God and the devil, then a reconciliation of such conflicts is ruled out as unthinkable. If communism, liberalism, and secular humanism are declared schemes of the devil, then it turns out to be the duty of every "true believer" to do away with these ills. A political program built on such grounds is inevitably characterized by extreme intolerance and authoritarianism. Simultaneously, the religious element of right-wing radical consciousness also serves as justification of anticipated failure in resolving the eternal conflict and alleviates the right-wing radical’s disenchantment—for if he takes on the devil himself he is sure to lose, while even small, temporary successes constitute an enormous victory.

The central place in the "moral code" of the right-wing radical consciousness belongs to the ethics of the patriarchal family. According to Merrill Root, an ideologist of right-wing radicalism, "we revere the family as a unit based on continuity of blood and purpose and meaning, on a spiritual culture, on a psychic entity... Thus the family, in its integrity, is a chief fortress for our God, against relativism, pragmatism, existentialism, and the collective tyranny of the state—or of the ‘democratic’ mass.” [158•1 "Strong families and strong leaders built this country,” Harold Voth, leader of the movement "in defense of the family”, has declared, "and strong families and strong leaders will save it.” [158•2

The "strong family”, revered by the right-wing radicals, hinges on implicit one-man management and the authority of the father—the “bread-winner”; the social role of women 159 should be restricted to running the household; children are brought up in conditions of strict discipline and loyalty towards "my home, my castle”; extramarital ties are excluded, and sex is treated according to the Bible—^as a sin justified only by the need for reproduction.

The patriarchal-authoritarian ideal of a "strong family" is extremely important for right-wing radical consciousness. The family is regarded as a natural, basic, God-blessed social community, linking the individual with the nation via other than class and political ties.

As such, the family is ordained to serve as the foundation of social stability, a kind of damper on social and political dissatisfaction. So far as the individual finds support in the family to accomplish his objectives, so far as the family helps him to overcome (or live with) the difficulties he comes up against, his urge to join forces with other individuals in political organizations to confront the state with social demands is weakened. In the words of one neoconservative ideologist, the family is the only "department of health, education and welfare that works". [159•1

The "strong family" is ordained to make the management of society easier in other respects too. The individual, getting accustomed within the framework of the family to authoritarian norms for adopting decisions, to a hierarchical distribution of social roles, to obedience and selfrestraint for the sake of the common good, is supposed to assimilate a definite type of political conduct, making him an "exemplary citizen”, who does not create problems for the ruling elite.

This "strong family" ideal propagated by the right wing was not interesting even for some right-wing ideologists way back in the ’60s. In the ’70s, however, it received a new and considerable articulation in the conditions of the actual process of the disintegration of the traditional bourgeois family in the United States. This process is expressed in an enormous growth in the number of divorces, in the forfeiting by men 6f many of their privileges in regard to women, in the spreading of "alternative forms" of family and sexual relations, built on hedonism and the negation of many traditional’ ethic norms, and in a sharpening of the conflict of the generations. Right-wing radical consciousness explains all these phenomena as the effect of the schemes of the liberal-reformists obsessed with ideas of “modernization” and “perfection” of society, or due to the atheists bent on destroying the religious foundation of the traditional family, or due to the 160 Communists engaging in "subversive activities" against America.

“The struggle for the family is ... an undeclared civil war, whose outcome will determine how our society defines itself," [160•1 writes Onalee McGraw. In this "civil war”, the right wing comes out under the slogan of a comprehensive "moral counterrevolution”, obstructing the approval of the Equal Rights Amendment to the US Constitution, demanding a ban on abortion, the establishment of a strict “moral” censorship of the mass media, a radical revision of the school c urrk ulums in order to wipe out all the ideas that in one way or another "undermine traditional ethics”, a purge of the teaching staffs, the abrogation of the practice of school desegregation, a resumption of the daily prayers held in the classrooms, the legalization of corporal punishment for the pupils, harsher court measures against juvenile crime and so on. "Textbooks have become absolutely obscene and vulgar,” says one of the appeals of the extreme right to "clean up America”. "Many of them are openly attacking the integrity of the Bible... Darwinian evolution is taught from kindergarten right through high school.” (See: Phi Delta Kappa, May 1980, p. 609.)

Individualism, as stated above, not only does not hinder the forming of a protesting consciousness under the slogans of militant nationalism and racism, but it constitutes a necessary condition for this process. Only a consciousness that in its protest keeps within narrow borders of individual proprietary interests is capable of assuming that " national renewal" by banning the class struggle, routing the left-wing forces and the labor movement, by replacing the existing “chaos” with a corporative “order” resting on the gun, and preparations for a general war to "save Western civilization" represent a “radical” way out of the crisis of contemporary capitalist society.

From the point of view of right-wing radical consciousness an individual has been endowed by nature with a dual quality, that of a producer and a proprietor. Both sides of this quality are given an extended meaning: the proprietor side includes every person who owns any kind of property, while to the producer side are relegated practically all those engaged in the private sector. This cheap popular print has no place for contradictions between the worker (who is regarded as a producer, as far as he works for a private company, and also as a proprietor, as he has his own house and car and some of the stock of this company) and the owner of the company (a proprietor, once he owns capital, and a “producer”, as he has invested this capital into 161 production, and, perhaps, takes part in running the enterprise). The only differences remaining between the two individuals, which cannot by any stretch of the imagination serve as fertile soil for any conflict between them, are the difference in the size of their property, explained by virtue of education, heredity, and so on, and the difference in the content of the “productive” role, explained by the division of functions between labor and capital. The absence of formal obstacles to the worker, who decides to put his savings into his own business, should ensure the individual the possibility of freely substituting one "production function" for another. It is supposed that the model works the better the wider scope there is for the play of market forces.

Here right-wing radicalism once more repeats the conservative postulates, this time of a libertarian fashion, widely publicized by the associations of employers. The difference between right-wing radical individualism and conservative individualism is that, while presenting this model as an ideal, right-wing radical consciousness at the same time admits that reality is quite some distance away from this model. The essence of the matter, from the viewpoint of right-wing radicalism, is that the producers-proprietors, who form a "middle class" and constifute the bulk of the population, are being exploited by the “parasitic” sections of the population through a mighty government apparatus which is increasingly restricting the freedom of the market. The conflicts and contradictions within this "middle class" are therefore explained by pressures from outside that distort the natural play or market forces and deplenish the wealth of the producers-proprietors.

The coalition of the "enemies of the middle class" includes those who one way or another are materially interested in the intensification of the economic role of the government, viz. the government bureaucracy, the poorest section of the population who live on government aid, the “nonproductive” intellectuals, the "Eastern Establishment" that has become intimately linked with the bureaucracy and multiplied its might thanks to the strengthening of the government. All these forces, the right-wing radicals assert, stand for “collectivism”, which is understood as a compulsory, governmental redistribution of the incomes from the pockets of the “producers” into the pockets of the “parasites”, supplemented by comprehensive interference by the government into the private life of individuals. Accordingly, the destruction of the mechanism of the governmental redistribution of incomes, the restoration of a completely free market, and the suppression of the " 162 collectivistic" aspirations of the nonproductive section of the population should return internal stability and prosperity to the essentially homogeneous "middle class" and, consequently, to the whole of society.

The unity of ownership and productive labor in the rightwing radical consciousness is merely formal. The right-wing radical protest basically represents a defense only of the property interests of the individual, remaining alien towards his labor interests. Defending the rights of the proprietor in opposition to governmental policy, right-wing radicalism defends the freedom of private enterprise. The laws and the government institutions which regulate the activities of private enterprise, the tax system, including the progressive taxation of incomes, the policy of stimulating economic growth, which leads to inflation—all this is roundly condemned as an encroachment on the economic interests of most of the employers, primarily of small business, for which the bureaucratic rules and regulations, the growing taxes, and the laws permitting trade-union activity turn out to be an insufferable burden. The antietatist sentiments of the bourgeoisie are one of the most important sources of all the varieties of right-wing radicalism, and they find expression especially vividly in its “market” variety, directly reflecting the everyday consciousness of the employer.

From the point of view of the impact of the right-wing radical consciousness a far greater role is played by its claims to defend broader property interests, not directly linked to private enterprise as such. A corresponding slogan was formulated by one ideologist in the following manner: "Let the individual keep his dollar!" The property of the individual who does not belong to the class of the employers, the property acquired by the sweat of his brow and ordained to satisfy his basic demands, is the object of a growing encroachment on the part of the government, whose policy is causing inflation and a greater tax burden. A complex, contradictory mechanism of a dual exploitation of the individual by the state-monopoly system appears in right-wing radical consciousness in the form of an absolute opposition of a “natural”, “free” market form of communion of individuals, making them proprietors, to an “unnatural”, coercive, etatist form of communion that constantly threatens their right to property.

Anticommunism is a necessary attribute of right-wing radical consciousness, and in their political fight the right-wing radicals always play the role of zealous, irreconcilable enemies of the communist movement and other leftwing forces. Declaring their anticoimnunism, the right-wing 163 radicals practically never regard the "communist threat" as an independent source of evil, feeling an urge to deduce it rather from race-ethnic differences, from a striving of financial capital to dominate the world, even from the schemes of the devil. The wish of the right-wing radicals to find additional arguments for their anticommunism is explained primarily by the crisis of the more traditional, conventional forms of anticommunist consciousness based on the opposition of bourgeois democracy tocommunism. Another reason is that right-wing radicalism fights not only communism, but also bourgeois democracy and for this reason alone it must look for other anticommunist slogans.

The negation of democracy by the right-wing radicals is not always expressed openly, the less so in America. Appealing to the existing dissatisfaction of the masses, defending in their rhetoric the "man in the street" from the arbitrariness of the almighty elite, the right-wing radicals try to project their movement as a democratic “popular” trend, allegedly striving to replace false bourgeois democracy with a genuine people’s power. They castigate bourgeois democracy for its inability to ensure "national unity" and to end the class struggle of the workers, for allowing the poorest sections of society to pressure the government while at the same time hampering the freedom of action of the punitive organs.

Attacking bourgeois democracy and liberalism, American right-wing radicals of today seldom oppose the bourgeoisdemocratic credo with a comprehensive alternative political system of their own. If we do not take into account the individual groupings that propagate a slightly renovated version of German fascism, then it should be admitted that right-wing radical consciousness has proved to be incapable of evolving a notion of the forms of power it would like to substitute for the existing system. Demanding the stepping up of the reprisals against the democratic forces and against all dissention and striving to destroy democratic rights and civil liberties, the right-wing radicals usually present the matter as if they are fighting for a return to the “original”, "truly American" forms of a socio-political system, dislodged by the advancement of “collectivism”.

This stand is sometimes interpreted by bourgeois researchers as a kind of romantic nostalgia which has nothing to do with reality. However, it appears that the matter is far more serious: the basic outlines of the “alternative” to which the right-wing radicals strive, consciously or unconsciously, are sufficiently clear-cut. It is a question primarily of abrogating the right of working people collectively to defend their interests, and, as an inevitable 164 consequence of this, blocking the channels for influencing the state apparatus on the part of the broad public. The balance of strength which has become established in the political system, with the organized power of the monopolies opposing the organized labor movement and other mass democratic movements (with government recognition of the legitimate right of these movements to fight for their demands), is planned to be radically changed in favor of the ruling class by the outlawing and liquidation of those “collectivistic” structures which nave been formed in the political system as a definite counterweight to the oligarchy, resulting from the persistent struggle waged by the labor movement and its allies. To confine the political rights of citizens to the sphere of strictly individual participation in politics on behalf of strictly individual interests in the conditions of the modern state-monopoly system would mean, in essence, a real ban on political liberties, that is, the establishment of a frank dictatorship of the state-monopoly elite.

Militarism as an important trait of right-wing radical consciousness is expressed in the apologetics of armed force as a means to implement the government’s foreign and home policy. The need of right-wing radical consciousness in a militaristic orientation is explained primarily by the fact that the task of destroying democracy can ultimately be resolved only with the help of a mass use of armed force. Besides this, the militarism of the right-wing radicals is explained by their notion of the police functions of the state as its most natural functions. Finally, the army apologetics is closely linked to militant nationalism, which is in need of both symbols and concrete forms of the organization of individuals "in the name of the nation”.

The foreign policy orientation of right-wing radical consciousness is based on anticommunism, on the cult of armed force as a means to implement foreign policy, and on extreme nationalism. The thesis of a "growing communist threat" to the West, which is incapable of offering effective resistance, is the initial premise of any right-wing radical analysis of world development. Right-wing radicalism deliberately rejects the idea of the historical nature of the world revolutionary process, and asserts that " communist threat" grows as the result of a secret global conspiracy of a section of the ruling circles in the West. The different types of right-wing radical consciousness identify this section differently (international bankers, international Jewry, the "intellectual elite" and so on) and they describe the motives and methods of this " treacherous Establishment" in the following manner.

p The Establishment is supranational and antinational. Its interests transcend national borders, it thinks in cosmopolitan terms and strives to take advantage of the national resources of the United States and of other countries in the interests of its own struggle for world domination;

as distinct from the “normal” employers (“producers”), the Establishment is parasitic, it creates no wealth and deprives others of their wealth by usury, taxation, nationalization, and direct expropriation. Whereas the source of the enrichment of the “producer” capitalist is the free market, the Establishment robs the “producers” with the help of the state;

the final aim of the Establishment is “collectivism” on a global scale under the aegis of a world state. For this end communism, socialism, social-democracy, the welfare state and also supranational formations—the United Nations, NATO, the International Monetary Fund and so on— have been “created”;

the anticommunism of the Establishment is completely false, for it coexists with communism in all its manifestations; at the same time it encourages the development of “collectivistic” tendencies in the West in the form of progressive taxation, the government’s social policy and the other trappings of the welfare state.

From this it logically follows that the struggle of the United States against communism is senseless while the "treacherous Establishment" which rides roughshod over national interests continues to reign. To "save the West" it is necessary to dislodge the cosmopolitan elite from power and to set up a regime expressing the "interests of the nation" and engaging in an uncompromising war against communism.

Advancing this strategic objective, right-wing radicalism at the same time defends the immediate foreign political demands of reaction: complete rejection of the policy of detente, a build-up of the military potential in order to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union, the extended use of military force in foreign policy, more support for reactionary dictatorships, no reliance on the reformist forces of the West and of the "third world”, and so on. But the right-wing radical stand on current affairs differs from the conservative stand in its more pronounced nationalistic slant. Thus, the demand to harden anticommunism in foreign policy is formulated in the slogans for "national freedom”, "liberation of captive nations”, and so on, whilst any criticism levelled at the South African, South Korean and other dictatorial regimes is condemned as 166 encroachments on their “sovereignty” and "national honor”. Under the aegis of the fight against "international bankers”, the US right-wing radicals have established their own network of international ties, which includes practically all the ultraright dictatorships of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and also most of the neofascist organizations of the world, including the Italian Scxial Movement—the National Right and the National Democratic Party of the FRG. During the mid-’70s, the idea of setting up an international anticommunist alliance (in opposition to the three “superpowers”), which would include the FRG, Japan, Taiwan, Brazil, Iran, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and a number of other countries, became popular among these circles. [166•1 It is indicative that the initiative in advancing this project be longed to the American right-wing radicals, who tanked on acquiring an international base for their own struggle for power within the United States.

Characteristically enough, the thesis regarding the senseless struggle against communism under the existing US regime, and other similar attacks against Washington often coincide with traditional American isolationism, which sees in the policy of active global interventionism by the United States a threat to the country’s internal stability. Right-wing radical consciousness does not understand, and does not want to understand, the logic of a modern American “empire”, based not only on military coercion, but also on a complex interlacing of economic and political ties, on a striving to accommodate to world social change and to take advantage of a wide range of political forces for its objectives. Most right-wing radicals belong to the social strata which are isolated from the process of foreign policy-making, whose interests practically are not represented in this process, and, most importantly, who are far more concerned at the socio-political changes taking place inside the United States than with what is going on beyond the borders of their country. Nevertheless, the right-wing radical trend is systematically used by the militaristic: groupings of the foreign policy elite as a strike force in the fight against international detente.

The above-mentioned features of contemporary American right-wing radical political consciousness characterize it as a whole. As regards its concrete, specific expressions, which are spelt out in corresponding right-wing radical constellations, here these features are presented in varying measure and in different combinations—more or less stable and representative. This gives grounds for 167 distinguishing three types of right-wing radical consciousness—radical-propertarian, radical-racist and right– populist.

Sankara remembered




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http://bermudaradical.wordpress.com/2010/10/15/23-years-since-the-assassination-of-thomas-sankara/

http://africanlegends.wordpress.com/2009/09/01/thomas-sankara-the-african-che/


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Sankara: ‘We are heirs
of the world’s revolutions’



Below is an excerpt from We Are Heirs of the World’s Revolutions.

The book contains several speeches by Thomas Sankara, who led the 1983-87 revolution in Burkina Faso. In October 1984 Sankara addressed the United Nations General Assembly. His presentation, which is excerpted here, explains how the peasants and workers of this West African country established a popular revolutionary government and began to fight the hunger, illiteracy, and economic backwardness imposed by imperialist domination. Copyright © 2002 by Pathfinder Press. Reprinted by permission.

BY THOMAS SANKARA



We had to take the leadership of the peasant revolts, signs of which were visible in a countryside that is panic-stricken by the advancing desert, exhausted by hunger and thirst, and abandoned. We had to give meaning to the brewing revolt of the idle urban masses, frustrated and weary of seeing limousines driving the elites around, elites that were out of touch, succeeding one another at the helm of state while offering the urban masses nothing but false solutions elaborated and conceived by the minds of others. We had to give an ideological soul to the just struggles of our popular masses as they mobilized against the monster of imperialism. The passing revolt, the simple brushfire, had to be replaced forever with the revolution, the permanent struggle against all forms of domination.

Others have explained before me, and others will explain after me, the extent to which the chasm has widened between the affluent peoples and those who aspire only to eat their fill, quench their thirst, survive, and preserve their dignity. But no one can imagine to what extent “the poor man’s grain” in our countries “has fattened the rich man’s cow”!

In the case of the former Upper Volta, the process was even more striking. We represented a wondrous condensation, the epitome of all the calamities that have ever befallen the so-called developing countries. The example of foreign aid, presented as a panacea and often heralded without rhyme or reason, bears eloquent witness to this fact. Very few countries have been inundated like mine with all kinds of aid. Theoretically, this aid is supposed to work in the interests of our development. In the case of what was formerly Upper Volta, one searches in vain for a sign of anything having to do with development. The men in power, either out of naiveté or class selfishness, could not or would not take control of this influx from abroad, understand its significance, or raise demands in the interests of our people.

In his book, Le Sahel demain [The Sahel of tomorrow], Jacques Giri, with a good deal of common sense, analyzes a table published in 1983 by the Sahel Club, and draws the conclusion that because of its nature and the mechanisms in place, aid to the Sahel helps only with bare survival. Thirty percent of this aid, he stresses, serves simply to keep the Sahel alive. According to Jacques Giri, the only goal of this foreign aid is to continue developing nonproductive sectors, saddling our meager budgets with unbearably heavy expenditures, disorganizing our countryside, widening our balance of trade deficit, and accelerating our indebtedness.

Just a few images to describe the former Upper Volta: 7 million inhabitants, with over 6 million peasants; an infant mortality rate estimated at 180 per 1,000; an average life expectancy limited to 40 years; an illiteracy rate of up to 98 percent, if we define as literate anyone who can read, write, and speak a language; 1 doctor for 50,000 inhabitants; 16 percent of school-age youth attending school; and, finally, a per capita Gross Domestic Product of 53,356 CFA francs, or barely more than 100 U.S. dollars.

The diagnosis was clearly somber. The root of the disease was political. The treatment could only be political. Of course, we encourage aid that aids us in doing away with aid. But in general, welfare and aid policies have only ended up disorganizing us, subjugating us, and robbing us of a sense of responsibility for our own economic, political, and cultural affairs. We chose to risk new paths to achieve greater well-being. We chose to apply new techniques.

We chose to look for forms of organization better suited to our civilization, flatly and definitively rejecting all forms of outside diktats, in order to lay the foundations for achieving a level of dignity equal to our ambitions. Refusing to accept a state of survival, easing the pressures, liberating our countryside from medieval stagnation or even regression, democratizing our society, opening minds to a world of collective responsibility in order to dare to invent the future. Shattering the administrative apparatus, then rebuilding it with a new kind of government employee, immersing our army in the people through productive labor and reminding it constantly that without patriotic political education, a soldier is only a potential criminal. Such is our political program.

On the level of economic management, we’re learning to live modestly, to accept and impose austerity on ourselves in order to be able to carry out ambitious projects… .

To all of you listening to me, allow me to say: I speak not only on behalf of my beloved Burkina Faso, but also on behalf of all those who are in pain somewhere.

I speak on behalf of the millions of human beings who are in ghettos because they have black skin or because they come from different cultures, and who enjoy a status barely above that of an animal.

I suffer on behalf of the Indians who have been massacred, crushed, humiliated, and confined for centuries on reservations in order to prevent them from aspiring to any rights and to prevent them from enriching their culture through joyful union with other cultures, including the culture of the invader.

I cry out on behalf of those thrown out of work by a system that is structurally unjust and periodically unhinged, who are reduced to only glimpsing in life a reflection of the lives of the affluent.

US armed forces: reflecting those whom they "defend"?

http://www.plp.org/challenge/2010/10/9/us-bosses-tactical-split-on-iran-war-army-loyalty.html

excerpt:

....In a September 28 speech at Duke University, Defense Secretary Robert Gates complained that officers and foot soldiers come increasingly from red states: “Currently, the percentage of the force from the Northeast, the West Coast and major cities continues to decline.”

Gates said that the military’s own decisions on where to locate bases have reinforced the trend, with a significant percentage of Army posts moved in recent years to just five states: Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina, Texas and Washington. This trend, Gates said, also affects the recruiting and educating of new officers.

“The state of Alabama, with a population of less than five million, has 10 Army ROTC host programs,” he lamented. “The Los Angeles metro area, population over 12 million, hosts four ROTC programs. And the Chicago metro area, population nine million, has three.” There is a risk, over time, Gates declared, of developing a cadre of military leaders that — politically, culturally and geographically — have less and less in common with the people they have sworn to defend.

....

The Context: Deflation

Continued Threat of Deflation
by David Rosnick

The Consumer Price Index rose 0.1 percent in September as consumer energy price inflation slowed to 0.7 percent after gains of 2.6 and 2.3 percent in July and August. Overall prices have grown at a 2.7 percent annualized rate over the last three months. The core CPI remained unchanged over the month and has now grown at a 0.7 percent annualized rate since June.

Over the last three months, major price categories have seen decelerating prices, including housing and transportation, but inflation in recreation, education and communication, and other goods have also fallen in recent months.

Of the categories in which inflation has fallen, only transportation prices rose in September -- 0.5 percent, compared to 1.3 and 1.2 percent the previous two months. In part, the lower inflation in transportation is due to slowing inflation in fuel prices, which grew 1.8 percent in September after rising 4.4 and 3.9 percent in July and August.

However, the price of used cars actually fell 0.7 percent last month -- the first such fall since before the cash-for-clunkers program began last summer. While it represents only a single month of data, it may at last signal the end of the tight supply of used cars resulting from a program that removed nearly 700,000 used vehicles from service. Even with the rapid (19.2 percent) rise in prices over the last 17 months, the price of used cars remains 9.5 percent below the 2001 peak.

Housing prices fell 0.1 percent in September as rents rose 0.1 percent and the more heavily weighted owners' equivalent rent remained unchanged. Owners' equivalent rent of primary residences has fallen 0.1 percent since June of 2009, but non-shelter core prices have risen 2.3 percent over that same period. The bubble-driven housing glut has resulted in real rents falling at a 1.9 percent rate over the last 15 months.

Elsewhere in the core index, apparel prices fell 0.6 percent and have now declined at a 0.9 percent rate over the last three months -- following the 1.3 percent rate of increase from March to June. Recreation prices fell 0.3 percent (a 2.3 percent rate since June) along with 0.1 percent declines in education and communication and other goods.

Amidst these price declines, food prices gained 0.3 percent in September. Though this does represent an acceleration of inflation in this non-core category of goods, the 1.2 percent rate of increase in food prices over the last six months is still below the 1.5 percent rate of the previous six.

Medical care also showed accelerating prices, jumping 0.6 percent last month. The faster inflation came in both commodities and services, particularly in hospital services -- the price of which grew 1.5 percent in September. Hospital services have grown at a 6.5 percent annualized rate -- more than 5.7 percentage points over the core rate of inflation.

Nonfuel import prices rose 0.3 percent in September, driven primarily by large increases in the price of finished and unfinished metals. The price of all nonfuel industrial supplies jumped 1.3 percent in September, but remains 1.5 percent below the level in May. This sudden acceleration is almost certainly a matter of volatility, as prices rose at least 1.3 percent in seven of the previous 12 months. On the other hand, the price of imported autos, parts, and engines rose only 0.2 percent while the price of other consumer imports rose 0.1 percent.

The price of imports has a significant impact on the balance of trade. For example, the price of commodity imports from China has risen 0.3 percent since the end of 2003 -- less than 0.05 percent per year. By contrast, the price of those from industrialized countries rose 22.8 percent and the price index for all commodities has risen 15.2 percent over the same period. Thus, the relative price of commodity imports from China have fallen, while those from industrialized countries have risen.

Change in Commodity Prices, Dec 2003-Sept 2010

Since 2003, the trade deficit with China has doubled from about $10 billion to more than $21 billion per month, while that with Canada, Germany, and Japan has shrunk from more than $13 billion to less than $10 billion per month. This provides even more evidence to support the Economics 101 argument that prices matter to buyers, and therefore exchange rate imbalances are significant drivers of trade imbalance.

Finally, the real wage fell by $0.01 in September. Absent significant employment gains, it is difficult to discern how purchasing power of workers can possibly lead to increased price pressures. As real rent prices continue to fall, and many commodity prices decline, there is a continued threat of deflation. This leaves every incentive to manage a fall in the dollar, rebalance trade, and re-energize domestic production.


David Rosnick is an economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, DC. This article was first published by CEPR on 15 October 2010 under a Creative Commons license.
URL: mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2010/rosnick151010.html

Friday, October 15, 2010

Our continuity with Lenin

Lenin’s political battle to maintain 
proletarian course of Russian Revolution


Introduction to new edition of ‘Lenin’s Final Fight’
draws lessons of the working class’s historic
line of march toward conquest of power


Part 1:

http://www.themilitant.com/2010/7415/741550.html


Part 2:

http://www.themilitant.com/2010/7416/741650.html


Part 3:

http://www.themilitant.com/2010/7417/741750.html

excerpt:
Revolutionary prospects for 21st century

As capitalism in the twenty-first century enters its deepest economic and social crisis since the decades spanning the first and second imperialist world wars, programmatic and strategic matters in dispute in the communist workers movement in the early 1920s once again weigh heavily in prospects for the working class worldwide to advance along its historic line of march toward the conquest of power.

“One of capitalism’s infrequent long winters has begun,” noted a political report adopted by the Socialist Workers Party in 2002, half a decade prior to the 2007 financial implosion that announced the imperialist order’s latest global crisis. And “with the accompanying acceleration of imperialism’s drive toward war, it’s going to be a long, hot winter.”

Even more important, slowly but surely and explosively, it will be one that breeds a scope and depth of resistance not previously seen by revolutionary-minded militants throughout today’s world… .

We find ourselves in the very opening stages of what will be decades of economic, financial, and social convulsions and class battles. [We] must internalize the fact that this world—the likes of which none of us have known before in our political lives—is not only the world that must be faced today, but the one we will be living and fighting in for many years.

By acting on this reality today, we will not be caught short politically as wars erupt, deeper social crises explode, pogroms are organized and attempted, and union conflicts become life-and-death battles. The proletarian party that exists tomorrow can only grow out of the proletarian party we put together today.2

In this effort, the political lessons of Lenin’s final fight, recounted in his own words in these pages, take on increasing importance for the working class, and for youth attracted to the power of working people to put an end to capitalism’s exploitative and oppressive social relations and transform the course of human history.

Did Stalinism make peace with Lukacs?


Editor's note: Recently I have encouraged some comrades here in Cleveland to read a little of Lukacs on the Marxist Internet Archive. I myself stand on George Novack's analysis of Lukacs in Polemics in Marxist Philosophy; I find the Lukacs of The Destruction of Reason much more useful than the Lukacs of History and Class Consciousness. An odd admission from a communist coming out of the U.S. SWP continuity, but there it is. More good Lukacs snippets can be found here.

Comradely,
Jay
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http://www.cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1000576

SWP and Lukács

Significant engagement Georg Lukács A defence of 'History and class consciousness': tailism and the dialectic Verso, 2000, pp182, £16

The recent publication of Tailism and the dialectic, apparently written in 1925-26 but never referred to by the author in his numerous autobiographical writings and interviews, marks another stage in the attempt of the Socialist Workers Party to appropriate the work of Georg Lukács as one of their own.

The book has a thought-provoking introduction from John Rees, one of the SWP's leading theoreticians (pp1-38) and has received a number of complimentary reviews in various SWP publications, alongside some critical comment in its International Socialism journal.

The most positive thing about the SWP's engagement has been its recognition of the need to fuse the understanding of complex philosophical themes with revolutionary praxis. When Althusserian 'Marxism' was fashionable amongst academics in the 1960s and 1970s, the almost overriding motif was its complete divorce from practice (although this failed to discourage the SWP's Alex Callinicos - a writer who was always more sceptical of Lukács - from embracing Althusser).

It should be stressed, however, that the SWP's project is not without its contradictions: indeed John Rees illustrates that it is likely to become intensely problematic. The root of this is the SWP's need to find theoretical sustenance for its current practice, which in its essentials is both formalistic and economistic. Alongside this is the organisation's traditional hostility to 'official' communism. In this review we will show how the dual commitment to idealistic political practice and defending Trotskyism leads Rees and others into any number of theoretical knots.

It is surely not an overstatement to say that History and class consciousness (1923) is the seminal text of 20th century Marxism. For those unfamiliar with the work, Lukács subjected the primitive, mechanistic 'Marxism' of the Second International to a blistering theoretical assault, making Marxist theory the object of an incisive revolutionary practice, in contrast to a dusty rehearsal of disembodied 'objective' laws. Lukács's negative comprehension of the development of bourgeois philosophical trends and their cross-fertilisation into the theoretical fallacies of the likes of Kautsky and Bernstein was essentially a response to the Second International's miserable surrender to nationalism in August 1914 and the subsequent success of the Russian Revolution in 1917. Lukács himself had played a courageous role in the failed Hungarian Revolution of 1919 and in the later illegal organisation of the Communist Party of Hungary.

History and class consciousness (hereafter HCC) was to receive a controversial reception inside the communist movement, the debate beginning shortly after its publication and running through the 5th Congress of Comintern in mid-1924. Tailism and the dialectic contains an extended polemic against two of Lukács's major critics at the time, Lazslo Rudas, a former associate of Lukács in the Hungarian movement, and the former Menshevik philosopher, Abram Deborin.

John Rees is quite clear that what we have here is Georg Lukács defending "his masterpiece, History and class consciousness" (p1). In case we are in any doubt, Rees adds: "Lukács's reply to Rudas and Deborin makes an unequivocal case for seeing a fundamental unity between History and class consciousness, Lenin and Tailism and the dialectic" (p27).

However, the title, A defence of 'History and class consciousness', is something not written on Lukács's unpublished manuscript, but added posthumously (partly because the publishers want to feed off HCC's international reputation), his own title being merely Tailism and the dialectic.

On the very first page of his manuscript Lukács casts considerable doubt on the status of such a 'defence': "There are many things in the book [HCC] that I deem needful of correction. I would formulate many of the things contained therein quite differently today. It is certainly not my intention to defend the book itself " (original emphasis - p47). Which is not to say that Lukács does not vigorously defend elements of HCC, but he instantly casts doubt on Rees's whole project. It was not Lukács's intention to defend HCC, but John Rees wants to do so.

Which naturally leads on to the question: why is Rees so concerned to construct his case in this manner? I would argue that his willingness to preserve Lukács's essentially Hegelian construct of the communist party as the 'identical subject-object' of the historical process is a complex theoretical rationalisation of how some sections of the SWP see their organisation in relation to the class struggle.

The point that Lukács was attempting to make in the formulation of the proletariat as the 'identical subject-object' of history was a simple one. Under the rule of capitalism, the working class is alienated from the products of its labour. Through the operation of the commodity and exchange value, 'things' appear to be beyond rational human control. Worse, the commodity appears to control the producer. Social constructs in this instance become reified, seemingly plucked out of the flow of human history. For Lukács it was the position of the working class inside a process which consistently degraded the means of social labour, allied to the conscious, subjective force of the Leninist party, which meant it could overthrow the capitalist order and be able to become the 'identical subject-object' of history: i.e., objects would no longer be alien entities, but henceforth amenable to human reason and control.

Rees lauds this sentiment in the following passage: "Subjective and objective constantly trade places. Our wrong subjective decision today will reappear as an objective determinant of our action tomorrow. The objective process and such moments of decision are like a knotted rope; each knot of decision forms part of the objective structure of events stretching out behind us, determining what and how we can decide today" (p30).

On the other hand, this is how Lukács formulates his position in Tailism and the dialectic: "It is impossible to separate the 'moment' from the 'process'. The subject does not face the object inflexibly and unconnectedly. The dialectical method does not intend either an undifferentiated unity or a definite separation of moments" (p56).

Now Rees has the intellectual honesty to present this alongside his above argument and goes on to applaud the notion of 'differentiated unity' in relation to the dialectic of nature. Nevertheless, the comparison is not flattering to Rees, who is still stuck with the idea of the 'identical subject-object' ("Subjective and objective constantly trade places ..." is actually an example of an 'undifferentiated unity'), whilst Lukács actually appears to be pulling apart his earlier Hegelianism, something that was in fact begun in HCC itself with its emphasis on concrete, historical action.

This is clearly recognised by SWPer Mark O'Brien, who argues that, in Tailism and the dialectic, Lukács " ... aims to defend his materialism, having rejected the possibility of an immediate connection between consciousness and the real world", thus marking a clear break with HCCInternational Socialism No89, winter 2000). Rees's notion of a "fundamental unity" between the two works begins to look more and more shaky. (

The reader will forgive the excursion into formal philosophical arguments; we can now judge Rees's formulation more concretely. Do the subjective and objective "constantly trade places"? Take the Bolshevik Party's decision to launch the insurrection in 1917 - a perfectly correct tactic considering the objective balance of forces that existed internationally at the time. Now this act is certainly proof of Lukács argument that subjective forces do not face the objective world inflexibly, in that it wove itself into one of the key objective determinants of 20th century politics. But the idea that the Russian Revolution 'traded places' with its objective environs is laughable when you consider the panoply of problems that the Soviet regime then faced (civil war, allied intervention, the failure of the world revolution), all of which went on to distort its liberatory promise. Which pays testimony to the complexity of reality and its subsequent impact on subjective decisions, often turning them into the opposite of what was originally intended.

Rees does appear to have some understanding of this. His argument that each decision "forms part of the objective structure of events" is a partial corrective that remains distorted by the overall presentation. Any attempt to pose the identity of subject-object is pure idealism: it can only be achieved in thought. The subjective direction of the proletarian party certainly has the ability to impact on the outside world, but social mediations will take their share of the proceeds. To argue anything else is merely the worst kind of ultra-left voluntarism.

Why then does Rees argue in this way? In reality his desire to enhance the status of HCC emanates from the present practice of the SWP. Even those most sympathetic to the organisation would have to admit that some of its recent analyses of the class struggle have been formalist in the extreme. A good example is the current thesis that we are now experiencing the '1930s in slow motion'.

At the CPGB's Communist University 2000, Chris Bambery illustrated perfectly the superficial nature of this perspective by his elevation of Seattle, various strike waves and the apathetic working class discontent with New Labour into key determinants of a supposedly growing class polarisation. Stuck at the level of peripheral appearances, the SWP fails to acknowledge the period of ideological reaction which was ushered in with the fall of the USSR in 1991.

In reality such theses are not really intended to provide the SWP with a compass in a variegated and contradictory social world: rather they are intended to keep the membership on the boil - which is perfectly buttressed by Rees's utilisation of Lukács's philosophy. If the subject (SWP) and the objective (class struggle) manifest themselves as an identity, if they "constantly trade places", then theories of 'the 1930s in slow motion' do not have to explain society in any sophisticated sense. As long as the organisation is kept sufficiently motivated, problems of revolutionary strategy will be solved by the SWP's simple insertion into the social world. In this manner the SWP kids itself that its analyses will turn themselves into a political pot of gold. The strategy of the organisation thus becomes emasculated around its narrow desire to keep itself together in the short term.

In a key section of Tailism and the dialectic Lukács gets to grips with Rudas's lame critique of the idea of 'imputed' consciousness (pp63-86), a passage that Rees lauds in his introduction.

Lukács gives a clear explanation of how a revolutionary organisation can impute from a given situation what a correct strategy for the working class should be: "By leaving out the inessential details of an objective situation, one can distinguish what people acting according to normal and correct knowledge of their situation were able to do or to allow. According to this measure, their mistakes or their correct insights, etc can be assessed" (p64). Lukács backed up this fundamental Leninist tenet with a number of references to the practice of Marx and Engels: "The criticism that Marx and Engels levelled at the bourgeois parties in 1848-49 consists - methodologically - in always showing what they could have done and should have done, given the objective economic and political situation, and what they, however, failed to do" (pp64-65).

Lukács thus spelled out an interventionist notion of class consciousness: the task of the communist parties is always to point out to the working class what they should and what they are able to do in a given scenario. In other words, it has a clear idea of what is correct and false consciousness on the part of the proletariat.

Rudas, on the other hand, thought this was idealism: "The consciousness of humans is a product of the world that surrounds them ... This elementary truth is however incompatible with any 'imputation' [of what a correct class consciousness should be] ... there is no other hypothetical consciousness, which exists nowhere but in the head of the philosopher ..." (p22).

Lukács was not slow to point out that this proscribed the role of the conscious elements of the revolutionary process, Rudas being seemingly content to fall back into the mechanical determinism of Second International 'Marxism'. For him, class consciousness arose automatically out the objective processes of capitalism. Rudas writes: "The English and the French are already beginning to become conscious of their historical tasks. And the others will follow. How do I know that? Because - says Marx - I know as a materialist that consciousness depends on social being, is a product of this social being. Since this being is constituted such that the proletariat through its suffering, etc is absolutely of necessity forced into action, so too is it absolutely necessary that in time its consciousness will awaken" (p67).

There you have it. Lukács pins the fate of revolution on the conscious action of revolutionaries leading the class, while Rudas looks forward to more proletarian "suffering". As you might expect, Lukács destroys Rudas's argument through his greater command of Leninism, making the trenchant point that Rudas is actually making a case for tailing the spontaneity of the class.

As we have stated above, John Rees gives his whole-hearted support to Lukács's enterprise in this instance. Yet we must stop for a moment and ask ourselves whether the contemporary practice of the SWP appertains to that of a Rudas or a Lukács?

Let us take the example of the Socialist Alliance. Does the SWP impute from this objective situation, where the working class has been disenfranchised from New Labour, and the main revolutionary organisations have come together, what is necessary and achievable? Does it attempt to lead the Socialist Alliance toward a revolutionary strategy? Does it propagandise for the formation of a single Communist Party? Not at all. Instead, it tails the social democratic elements of the Alliance and seeks to make it an outlet for the low level of discontent against Blairism.

The products of this classical economism can be seen in the ahistorical manner in which the SWP refers to the Socialist Alliance as a 'united front', which in reality is merely an attempt to step around the fact that the SA is composed, in the main, of members of existing revolutionary organisations. A more perfect example of the kind of politics that Lukács was polemicising against would be hard to find.

Lukács also offers us another passage which has clear echoes in today's ideological struggles. Lumbered with the idea that class consciousness is essentially fixated on mass psychology, Rudas attempts to mock Lukács: "Now one might believe that comrade Lukács has discovered a third place, where class consciousness realises itself. Perhaps in the head of a god or many gods, perhaps in the head of Madame History or some such thing" (p74).

This extract could have been lifted out of any contemporary polemic against the CPGB. When you pose supposedly 'maximalist' demands (abolition of the monarchy for example), the likes of the SWP (alongside their economistic bedfellows in the Socialist Party, the Alliance for Workers Liberty and Workers Power) will give you a Rudas-like reply: 'real' workers aren't interested in that! Our protagonists then move on to accuse us of being obsessed with abstraction.

Lukács gives a pertinent reply to Rudas and his modern-day followers: "But let me mollify comrade Rudas (or, better put, let me upset his tail-ending): this 'third place' is not that difficult for a communist to find: it is the Communist Party" (original emphases - ibid.). Therefore Lukács makes it perfectly clear that any attempts to proscribe a party putting forward slogans that are beyond the current psychology of the working class actually leads on to the undermining of the conscious element in the preparation of the revolution.

The above passages illustrate why the SWP's promotion of this book is such an excellent thing. Mired in economism, it has continually failed the test of Leninism throughout its existence. The fact that young comrades will be picking up Lukács's text, and finding in it a demolition of their world view can only be to the ultimate benefit of the SWP.

The other major problem with Rees's introduction is its conceptualisation of Lukács relationship with Stalinism (pp32-35). Now admittedly Rees states that he does not have enough space to do justice to this complex subject. Nevertheless, he does make some detrimental accusations concerning Lukács's mature development.

After producing HCC in 1923, Lukács brought himself to a tactical accommodation with Stalin in the mid-1920s after perceiving that the post-war revolutionary wave had run its course. Lukács subsequently argued in 1968 that Trotsky's faction of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union offered no alternative to those of Stalin, Zinoviev and Bukharin, because it shared their subordination to the technical and economic consolidation of the Russian Revolution at the expense of the strategic perspective of working class democracy (G Lukács The process of democratization New York 1991, pp107-115). Lukács remained politically hostile to Trotskyism throughout his life, although he never questioned either Trotsky's ability or his personal integrity.

Whilst the SWP is not an orthodox Trotskyite organisation, Trotskyism remains one of the cornerstones of its world view. Hence writers such as Rees are forced to limit their appreciation of Lukács to a relatively thin band of work: HHC (1923), Lenin: a study in the unity of his thought (1924) and now Tailism and the dialectic (1925-26). Anything published after this (i.e., around 45 years of work) is simply beyond the Stalinist pale.

As far as I can judge, Rees follows the thinking of Michael Löwy's Georg Lukács - from romanticism to Bolshevism (which offers a wonderful account of Lukács's early development, but falls to bits when Löwy views 'Lukács and Stalinism' through orthodox-Trotskyite spectacles). This is particularly evident in his treatment of 'Moses Hess and the problems of idealistic dialectics' (1926), where Rees sees Lukács's respect for Hegel's 'reconciliation with reality' as a motif for his accommodation with Stalin and the partial collapse of his dialectical outlook (p34).

Rees makes the questionable assumption that, "Thereafter, Lukács was often a critic of Stalinism, but only ever a right critic" (p35). In a similar vein he argues that, after the defeat of the 'Blum theses' in 1928 (in which Lukács attempted to steer the Hungarian Party away from ultra-leftism), Lukács "decided to withdraw from active politics and to cultivate philosophical and aesthetic concerns" (p34). Contained within this compact analysis are a whole raft of misconceptions.

The latter statement makes it look as if Lukács ducked out of the struggle at a time when the Stalinist regime was consolidating itself. In fact this is only a very partial truth. This is how Lukács judged his writings of the 1930s and 1940s at the end of his life: "It is not hard to see today that the main direction of these essays was in opposition to the dominant literary theory of the time. Stalin and his followers demanded that literature provide tactical support to their current political policies ... As everyone knows, no open polemics were possible during that period. Yet I did protest consistently against such a conception of literature. A revival of Marx and Lenin's views regarding the complicated dialectic, rich in contradiction, between the political and social positions of writers and their actual works, ran counter to Zhdanov's prescriptions. In expounding such and similar views through analyses of a Balzac or a Tolstoy, I not only offered a theory in opposition to the official line but also by clear implication a critique of the official literature" (G Lukács Writer and critic and other essays London 1970, p7).

The reader will forgive the length of the quote, but it does clarify exactly what Lukács was trying to do in constructing a 'guerrilla struggle' against the Stalinist bureaucracy. This is not to say that this approach does not have its problems. Mészáros has pointed out on a number of occasions that the abstract nature of this conflict eventually left Lukács bereft of concrete solutions to the crisis of 'official' communism. Nevertheless, his concentration on aesthetics and philosophical themes, which Rees refers to as "scholarly seclusion in Moscow's Marx-Engels Institute"(p35), was not an idle fancy on his part.

In the above passage Lukács demonstrates the nature of the Stalinist bureaucracy: its essentially subjective and manipulative approach to the problems of constructing a socialist society - the logical outcome of its inability to develop democratic control on the part of the proletariat in the Soviet Union. Thus, as Jack Conrad has well illustrated, this left the bureaucracy adrift in a society that it simply could not control in any rational sense. Therefore Lukács's literary emphasis on realism, as opposed to mere tactical manipulation, cut to the very core of the bureaucracy's oppressive existence. In no sense can this so-called 'reconciliation with reality' be judged as criticism from the 'right', precisely because of the democratic questions it begged about the USSR.

Through his evident inability to conceptualise the nature of the bureaucracy, Rees proves unable to give any sort of balanced assessment of Lukács's opposition to Stalinism. His problems also stem from the deeper source of squaring his views against a Trotskyite assessment of the Soviet Union. In general terms Trotskyites impose a rigid identity-reasoning on their perceptions of Stalinism and the 'official' communist movement. All the facets of its existence are ruled against its anti-Bolshevik usurping of the Russian Revolution. The logical incoherence of this idealist standpoint is beautifully illustrated by Rees's assessment of Lukács's relationship with Stalinism. Important contradictions fall from view, simply because of his (completely correct) unwillingness to align himself with Leon Trotsky.

Having dealt with John Rees, let us now move to deal with some of the issues raised by Mark O'Brien in International Socialism No89 (pp119-129).

As we have seen above, O'Brien usefully backs up Lukács's statement that the object of Tailism and the dialectic is not merely to defend HCC in its entirety. O'Brien's critique is centred on the second part of the book, where Lukács deals with the dialectics of nature (pp94-137). Despite the interesting points raised by O'Brien it must be said that he never really moves beyond abstract, philosophical themes (although, as we shall see, he has a 'hidden' political case to make), whereas Lukács is much more concrete about the context of the argument.

The scenario which Lukács establishes is once again that of combating economism and the tail-ending of spontaneity in the workers' movement: "The bourgeois class, even its most significant scientific representatives, sticks to the immediacy of social forms and is therefore not able to recognise society in its totality, and in its becoming: that is to say ... as theoretically and historically dialectical. The opportunistic streams of the labour movement have sensed instinctively why they have to direct their attacks precisely against the dialectic: only by getting rid of the dialectic has it become possible for them to forget historical materialism's advance beyond the immediacy of bourgeois society, and for them to complete their ideological capitulation in the face of the bourgeoisie" (p94).

Therefore it was Lukács's recognition of Lenin's long struggle against all forms of economism that proved the foundation for his denial of an immediate relationship between humans and nature (and the social structures built on its foundation): " ... what my critics call my agnosticism is nothing other than my denial that there is a socially unmediated - i.e., an immediate - relationship of humans to nature in the present stage of social development ... Therefore, I am of the opinion that our knowledge of nature is socially mediated, because its material foundation is socially mediated ..." (p106).

Rudas showed just how disastrous the rejection of such a standpoint could be when he argued that natural scientists were spontaneously coming toward dialectical materialism through contact with the natural world: "They too are gradually realising that their science is 'drumming' dialectics into them" (p95). Lukács was not slow to link this reliance on spontaneity and immediacy with Rudas's miscomprehension of the role of the Party. The insistence that correct knowledge can be gained through immediate contact with nature and society effectively strips Marxism of its ability to criticise the partiality of bourgeois science and the need for revolutionaries to consciously intervene.

Lukács also rejects any reliance on simple categories of mediation (the way in which humans conceptualise the world), arguing that their determination and discernibility are dependent on higher, more structured forms of mediation. He quotes Marx to suggest that, "the method of advancing from the abstract to the concrete is ... the way in which thinking assimilates the concrete and reproduces it as a concrete mental category" (p110).

To make this point more concrete, Lukács goes on to quote a passage from Marx's Theories of surplus value: " ... [capitalist] crisis ... cannot exist without manifesting itself at the same time in its simple form, as the contradiction between sale and purchase and the contradiction of money as a means of payment. But these are merely forms, general possibilities of crisis, and hence also forms, abstract forms, of actual crisis. In them, the nature of crisis appears in its simplest forms ... But the content is not yet substantiated ... These forms alone, therefore, do not explain why their crucial aspect becomes prominent and why the potential contradiction contained in them becomes a real contradiction" (p111).

Therefore, higher forms of mediation are vital if the working class is to master an understanding of capitalism in its totality. If its critique remains fixed at the level of appearances (i.e., the forms of simple mediation such as sale and purchase) then it stays at the stage of bourgeois political economy with its apologetic or reformist political conclusions. Again we are brought against the necessity of fighting any tendency towards spontaneity and immediacy on the part of the workers' movement. Capitalism is fought with Marx's ascent from the abstract to the concrete or it is not fought at all.

Mark O'Brien has immense problems with all this. Indeed the comrade perceives much more clearly than John Rees that Tailism and the dialectic cannot be simply squared off against existing SWP practice, although he leaves us to read this from between the lines.

O'Brien shows that he is completely blind to the Leninist problematic of Lukács's analysis, appearing confused as to why he throws out the notion of humans having immediate contact with the world with such "urgency": "For once the unmediated contact between the human subject and the world has been rejected, subject and object are indeed irredeemably thrown apart" (M O'Brien International Socialism No89, winter 2000, p127). As we have demonstrated above, Lukács ditched the notion of immediacy (and thus the idealist construct of the 'identical subject-object') precisely because it would potentially lead in practice to the disorganisation of the vanguard Party. If workers can spontaneously gain a knowledge of capitalism through immediate contact with its structures, then what price Bolshevism?

It therefore becomes clear why O'Brien finds Lukács's rigorous defence of Leninism so uncomfortable. In its practice the SWP appears to rely on the proletariat's immediate contact with capitalist economics as enough to solve the development of class consciousness. That is why Socialist Worker, its agitational paper, seeks to mirror the spontaneous reality of the working class back to them in a more concentrated form. Any project of developing the working class politically (in other words, leading the class) is completely absent from its pages. This approach precisely neglects the fact that even in a 'radical' spontaneous outbreak of strikes, the culture of the workers will be heavily mediated by the ideological superstructures of capital. The SWP must cling on to this idea of immediacy, otherwise its whole modus operandi begins to disintegrate.

We encounter similar errors when we move on to consider O'Brien's rejection of Lukács's concentration on the higher, as opposed to simple, forms of mediation. He argues: "... in relation to the question of immediacy, Lukács seems blind to the first part of [a] quote from Marx - 'Hunger is hunger'. Humans have immediate needs which are invariant. If human experience were entirely historically mediated, there would be no underlying continuity between epochs, and Marx's concept of 'labour' could never have been the key to understanding all other forms of society with their concrete historical mediations" (p125).

Of course, Lukács was well aware of simple mediations such as 'hunger', but, in the context of defeating tailist politics, is an 'immediate' emphasis on this effective? O'Brien does give the game away: "The relative weight of the 'higher', more theorised categories and the 'simpler', less theorised categories is a matter of real history and not one of a priori assertion" (ibid.).

You will not find a more complete distortion of Lukács's case. It was precisely "real history" (and not some abstract ordering) that he was interested in. More specifically the Second International with its simplistic economism, and the Bolshevik victory in 1917 with its 'higher', political categories. In short the difference between tailism and Leninism.

Once again, the reason O'Brien defends simplistic forms of mediation is that these are a staple diet of SWP practice. The organisation's propaganda consists of simple economistic 'them-us', 'good-bad' platitudes. Socialist Worker does not attempt to point the proletariat to the sophisticated understanding it needs of the totality of capitalist relations. Rather it suggests that 'real workers' are not interested in all this. To which we answer that it is precisely the job of Leninists to propagate it.

If it has done nothing else, this review has shown how the SWP's attempt to laud Lukács is fraught with difficulty. His pre-1927 work is saturated with polemical assaults on the economism that the SWP practises today. Lukács's later output is similarly difficult because of his rejection of Trotskyism. Precisely the reasons why the SWP's engagement with the greatest Marxist theoretician of the 20th century is so significant.

Phil Watson