MAX WEBER’S SOCIOLOGY OF THE STATE
The German philosopher, sociologist and historian Max Weber (1864-1920) exerted considerable influence on the formation of political sociology as an independent discipline in contemporary Western science of society. The content of Weber’s political ideas has to be seen in the light of the role of ideological leader of German moderate bourgeois liberalism which he endeavoured to pay throughout the crisis period of German political history, which culminated in the downfall of the monarchist regime and the establishment of the Weimar Republic.
Right up to the defeat of Germany in World War I Weber shared the general conviction of the leaders of the German liberal bourgeoisie that constitutional monarchy was the most acceptable model from the viewpoint of political 75 succession, legitimacy and implementation of the imperialist policy of a ’strong state’. This view was set forth in the work of F. Neumann, a founder of the German Democratic Party, Democracy and Empire, in which he tried to combine monarchist ideas with bourgeois-liberal political values. Western scholars have repeatedly noted the mutual influence of Weber’s and Neumann’s political views. Weber saw the main reason for the ineffectiveness of Wilhelm II’s regime in the lack of competent political leadership which, in his opinion, was due to the profound misfit between Germany’s economic and political structures. He frequently levelled withering criticism at various aspects of the regime, castigating it for the catastrophic consequences of Germany’s home and foreign policy between 1900 and 1918. In 1918, Weber changed his political tune and formulated the idea of a ’plebiscite leadership democracy’ (plebiszitaren Fiihrerdemokratie] that reflected his class position on questions of Germany’s political development. Weber proceeds from the idea that the political system of late capitalist society decisively depends on the operation of the tentacular structure of the professional bureaucracy. This thesis rests on Weber’s historical and economic research undertaken from a position of defence of bourgeois-liberal values of ’rational capitalism’ and ’individual freedom’. From Weber’s viewpoint, with all the multiplicity of specific historical forms of economic life, it contains two countervailing tendencies— rational individual enterprise and total statification (bureaucratisation) of economic activity.96 According to his economic theory, the specific ‘rationalism’ of Western culture embodied in the 76 religious ethics of Protestantism became the basis for the realisation, by the mid-19th century, of the first tendency in the industrial states of Western Europe and the USA.^^97^^ He sees the formation of state-monopoly capitalism at the turn of the century as an inevitable consequence of the second tendency’s development. Total bureaucratisation, he claims, is the invariable fate of all modern democracies that have no other choice.^^98^^ In so far as he views bureaucracy as an ’instrument of authority’ that has its source in the ’universal rationalisation’ and is autonomous in relation to social classes and groups, the main problem of Weber’s democracy concept is reduced to defining the control mechanisms over the bureaucratic apparatus. Without hesitation he rejects the well-known principles of ‘classical’ democracy theory as unrealistic and ushers to the forefront the technique of selecting the political elite which, could effectively subordinate the bureaucracy to its own objectives. He describes political leadership acting as a counterweight to formal-rational characteristics of the apparatus as ‘charismatic’." As the eminent student of Weber’s theoretical legacy Wolfgang Mommsen, Professor of History at the University of Diisseldorf, rightly notes, the importance of parliamentary democracy in his understanding of it was ’essentially reduced to two functions: selection of political leaders and control of purely technical administrative bureaucracy which, consequently, was not expected to fulfil tasks of political leadership’. ^^10^^°
When analysing Weber’s views on democracy, many of which were expressed iij article form (Weber was an influential political journalist), 77 we should bear in mind the peculiarities of his method of studying politics and political power. Being a neo-Kantian, he denied the existence and possibility of studying any objective historical laws as a matter of principle. In his view, sociology was a rational discipline, striving to gain an interpretive understanding of social behaviour with the assistance of typological methods. ^^101^^ Although Weber himself was a critic of psychology in the social sciences, his typology of political behaviour is based on the use of certain psychological characteristics ascribed to the subjects of behaviour. He claimed that all political actions can be interpreted depending on their orientation on certain kinds of belief in the legitimacy of the existing order. From this standpoint, two models may be singled out and counterposed to each other: 1. rational-legal authority whose essential element is professional bureaucracy, and 2. charismatic authority resting on the irrational belief of the masses in superhuman or supernatural qualities of the leaders.
Weber needed the notion of charisma to explain the reasons for political change and describe dynamic aspects of politics. He saw in charismatic leadership an alternative to total bureaucracy whose consequences were considered to be particularly threatening in view of the balance of power in Germany’s political arena towards the end of World War I. He called upon its political leaders to form a new political system in which the main support would be a ’strong parliament’ and the activity of national political parties (in a series of articles in Frankfurter Zeitung, November 1918). This system was designated primarily to effectively neutralise the political 78 activity of both the right-wing conservative groups and the left, especially the communist, parties and organisations.
Weber’s practical views on ’mass democracy’ took shape under the impact of the studies of James Bryce, M. Ostrogorsky and Robert Michels who uncovered certain real processes of the concentration of power in the hands of elitist groups using liberal-democratic institutions for implementing their political supremacy. Weber had no doubts that democracy was impossible without popular mobilisation by political elites and that ’any attempt to influence the masses necessarily includes certain elements of charisma’. ^^102^^ He saw the main aim for ‘democratising’ Germany’s political structure not in the consistent implementation of the bourgeois-democratic principle ’of ruling in the name of the people’, but in removing the obstacles in the way of complete bourgeois power—the domination of uncontrolled bureaucracy and the political influence of the semifeudal class of large-scale landowners. On the other hand, ‘democratisation’ was supposed to establish political institutions capable of halting the march of socialism as a historical alternative to the capitalist system. Being a fierce critic of the communist movement and ideology in his political articles, Weber overtly defended the domination of the bourgeoisie and the need to preserve capitalism. Socialism for him meant merely universal ‘statification’, leading to the unrestrained rule of bureaucracy, while proletarian dictatorship meant bureaucratic dictatorship. ^^103^^
Under the impact of the 1918 political events in Germany and the collapse of personal attempts 79 to take part in politics as a German Democratic Party candidate, the focus of Weber’s constitutional programme switched from a ’strong parliament’ to the charismatic personality of the Reichsprasident (article in Berliner Borsenzeitung, 25 February 1919). Inasmuch as the source of supreme legitimacy of the Reichsprasident was a plebiscite, ttie nation’s leader was able to take individual decisions on paramount political issues outside any democratic institutions and norms. The crux of Weber’s argument was that only a president possessing charismatic virtues was able to ensure the nation’s political unity, while parties and parliament were supposed to reflect the clash ol fragmentary socio-economic interests. As he wrote, ’Only a president directly elected by the people as head of executive power, as the top chief of the administration, as holder of the right to a delaying veto, dissolution of parliament and organisation of a popular referendum, embodies genuine democracy which means subordination of the nation to the personally chosen leader rather than the arbitrary action of political cliques.’ ^^104^^
Weber’s programme expressed the vital political interests of those groups of the monopoly bourgeoisie which, while maintaining a formal respect for parliamentary democracy, saw in the ’strong personality’ of a Reichsprasident a chance to deal with the acute class problems of capitalist society and to establish political order that could guarantee stable capitalist economic development. At the same time, the idea bore the obvious imprint of Weber’s personal ambitions, hankering as he was after an exclusive role in reconstructing Germany’s political system. The left-wing 80 liberal circles of Gorman intellectuals saw Weber as a political leader of the first rank, a potential leader of the German nation in its critical hour. Weber, however, was unable to play such a role and realise his plan of political reconstruction. In his zeal to substantiate the transforming significance of a charismatic leadership, he practically ignored the likelihood of that charisma leading to a totalitarian regime, and that still leads to embarassment among political scientists who subscribe to his ideas. As Mommsen writes, ’Many scholars have been puzzled by the fact that Weber’s ideal-typical theory of “charisma” does not allow any distinction between the "genuine charisma of responsible democratic leaders, as for instance, Gladstone or Roosevelt, and the pernicious charisma of personalities like Kurt Eisner or Adolf Hitler." Where then is the borderline between a type of charismatic rule which guarantees freedom within a democratic social order, and that which may result in the emergence of a totalitarian or quasitotalitarian regime? Weber’s political sociology is so designed that this question must be left unanswered.’105 On that basis some scholars accuse Weber of providing a political theory to prompt various social groups in the 1920s and 1930s to adopt fascist ideology. In fact, however, the orientation of his ‘charisma’ concept was based not on some hidden sympathies with autocratic regimes and ideologies, but on a desire to reduce to a minimum actual popular participation in implementing authority within the bounds of parliamentary democracy. The masses were to be provided merely with the chance to choose between rival elites and to support their behaviour. Democracy, 81 in Weber’s view, does not envisage the responsibility of a political elite or any institutions to control political decision-making.
This idea is closely bound up with his theory of political power and the state. The ‘power’ category here meant the opportunity existing within certain social relations which permits certain groups to have their way despite resistance, irrespective of the grounds for that opportunity. The theoretical grounds for distributing power may be the ’class situation’, ’status group’ and ‘party’, but the content of such categories prevents any definition of the actual sources of power. Of paramount importance in Weber’s theory is the factor of monopoly use of force which he treats as an inherent phenomenon of social organisations.
Political elites using legitimate force are portrayed as independent groups coming out as active elements of political history. The masses, however, are at best viewed as an object of political ‘mobilisation’. Elites are the creators of certain types of legitimation and successfully preserve their power for as long as they succeed in upholding the viability of their aspirations for supremacy. Weber finds the historical roots of legitimation in the mystical and religious beliefs of social and political elites (a large part of his sociology of religion is devoted .to describing historical types of legitimation).
His definition of ‘law’ is also bound up with legitimate coercion. Weber defines any ‘order’ as ‘law’ if the likelihood exists of deviant behaviour being met with legitimate force employed by a special group of people. He therefore treats ‘law’ even more widely than the 82 sociological doctrines of law produced in the early
20th century (Lamber, Erlich, et al.). The state serves as the apparatus for ensuring such a likelihood; he claims that a coercive political association may be termed the ‘state’ to the extent that its administrative body successfully enforces a monopoly of legitimate use of physical force for maintaining order. A rationalised bureaucracy is a type of ’legal power’ and, consequently, decisions taken by the bureaucracy are ‘law’. Of particular interest to sociology, in his view, is the question of who actually has control of the administrative apparatus (i.e., type of elite), while the traditional problems of juridical science utterly lose any sense for sociology.
Weber’s approach is in marked contrast with 19th century juridical doctrines. Jurisprudence as the basis of liberal outlook is thrown out the window. Weber makes no bones about linking his notions of democracy with politically active bourgeois groups not confined to the bounds of formal legitimacy, but capable of carrying out effective command of German society during its political reconstruction. That elite, in his opinion, also had to cope with the task of turning Germany into a strong imperialist state of world importance. Considerable differences, however, exist between Weber’s practical programme and his theoretical views; these stem from the contradictory nature of his political premises that lie in the mainstream of bourgeois-liberal traditions. As a realistic sociologist, he appreciated that concentration of power in the circumstances of incipient state-monopoly capitalism would invariably lead to the destruction of rationalism in politics; yet he unsuccessfully tried to come up 83 with an acceptable answer in a semi– authoritarian, semi-democratic system combining charismatic legitimacy and rational leadership.
The ambiguity of his political programme laid him open to fierce criticism from the most diverse ideological schools. In particular, the elements of bourgeois democracy contained in his theory brought down on him attacks from the Nazi theoreticians Carl Schmitt and Ghristoph Steding. ^^106^^ A number of bourgeois liberals accuse Weber of totalitarianism and anti-democracy. Thus, the noted Canadian political scientist Robert Presthus writes that he really had no conception of democracy and that ’his conception of leadership, moreover, was essentially aristocratic, somewhat freighted with mysticism.’^^107^^ Yet, criticism of Weber’s idea of democracy did not prevent extensive use by Western political scientists of various elements of his political theory. What is more, Weber’s principal methodological ideas in studying political power greatly influence the direction and content of contemporary political sociology in the USA and Western Europe.
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| TITLE: | Contemporary Political Science in the USA and Western Europe |
| TRANSLATOR(S): | James Riordan |
| UNCLASSIFIED: | general editor Shakhnazarov, G.Kh. |
| PUBLISHER: | Progress Publishers |
| COPYRIGHT: | «Hayna», 1982
English translation © Progress Publishers 1985
Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
We are making available to our readers the final version of the 2010 World Perspectives document, which was amended and passed unanimously by the World Congress of the IMT in Marina di Massa on August 7, 2010. Part One analyses the world economic crisis, looking into the different factors that led to the most serious crisis of capitalism since the 1930s.